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Violent Attachments,  
Hagar Kotef1 
 
A standard critique of empire holds that imperial rule nourishes and feeds off the 
cultivation of ignorance, that empire is in the business of limiting, distorting, and 
obscuring knowledge and that with more of it, empires would be more vulnerable 
to critique; . . .  that knowledge pierces what obscures the workings of power, 
weakens its hold, and, with sustained exposure, could be made to crash. . . . I argue 
that these accounts . . . may be for us to question, if not refute. (Ann Stoler) 
 
This essay asks about the shape a critique of violence should take, about its scope and 
conditions of possibility, when violence is both visible and embraced rather than denied. It 
seeks to unpack a “structure of feeling,” in Raymond Williams’s words,1 in which violence 
becomes an explicit part of collective identities. The theoretical-political question driving this 
analysis can be put in these terms: how should violence that is woven into what gives meaning 
to our lives be theorized—but also resisted? The concrete geopolitical setting that informs both 
my query and my analysis is Israel/Palestine, but the argument potentially stretches beyond 
this context, albeit with necessary adaptations. To allow this potentiality to echo I move, at 
times, between various threads and fields, between different kinds of “selves” (individuals, 
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groups, states), and between different modes of violence, which I will often refer to here as 
modes of generating injury. 
At its core, the essay questions one main mode of critique of violence, which works along the 
lines Stoler questions in the epigraph: the assumption that, at least in the case of 
democratic/liberal contexts, violence is sustainable only as long as it remains hidden or 
somehow unacknowledged. It is the assumption, to repeat Stoler’s words, that “knowledge 
pierces what obscures the workings of power, [thereby] weakens its hold.” Accordingly, the 
work of critique within this framework is to render violence visible; to expose the degree to 
which it dominates political arrangements. If only people would see, this violence would end 
or be fractured. This account—still with Stoler—“may be for us to question, if not refute.”2 
I follow here Yves Winter in proposing that we should consider an alternative framework: not 
one in which “invisibility . . . allows violence to be repeated and reproduced” but one that sees 
“repetition and reproduction [of violence]” as the source of what Winter calls violence’s 
invisibility, but what I contend is its normalization (a significant distinction, as the visual field 
is not re-called-on in order to mark a presumed absence of that which is there).3 The argument 
will progress in four parts. I begin with a brief illustration of two ways of situating the self vis-
à-vis their own violence. My illustration is located in Israel/Palestine yet it is but one example 
of other political formations in which the existence of some—their lives, their bodies, their 
security, and their prosperity—is conditioned on inflicting violence or insecurity on others. 
This is therefore as much a question of capitalism as it is a question of national identities or 
white supremacy. For me, however, it is primarily a question of settler colonialism, where the 
very making of political belonging is a form of dispossession, destruction, and, as Patrick 
Wolfe makes clear, elimination.4 
The following section provides a rudimentary map of the various approaches in the literature 
for analyzing how mass or state violence are being conceived (and as part of this, often 
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justified) by those engaging in them. It focuses on the approach captured by the epigraph, which 
I term “dissociation.” My purpose, in the third section, is to add another model to this list. I 
draw on queer, feminist and poststructuralist understandings of desire in order to show how 
these may work to explain the relation between colonizers and violence. These understandings 
will be incorporated into my argument primarily through the claim that to understand the 
dynamics and endurability of settler colonialism we need to understand also what Stoler termed 
the “‘emotional economies’ of empire.”5 In this sense, I work with a wide body of literature 
that argues that colonization cannot be understood without the networks of sentiments invested 
in it and the social textures it both works on and fabricates.6 I further draw on queer/feminist 
theories of subjectivity to highlight desire as socially constructed. With this framework I argue 
that the social settings of settlement are likely to facilitate a desire to these very settings and 
with them, to violence itself. Significant to this argument is also the understanding introduced 
by this body of thought, that we develop attachments to structures of injury. With it I show the 
affectual mechanisms that sustain social and political identities that are violent due to their 
mere positionality. In the final section, I return to Israel/Palestine to unpack this model more 
concretely. 
  
1. Shavit’s Two Nakbas 
In 2003, Ari Shavit, a progressive reporter writing for the Israeli daily Ha’aretz, who—at least 
for a while—was seen as a representative of the Zionist left in Israel, interviewed Edward Said. 
The interview begins with long descriptions of Said’s family home in Jerusalem, which later 
become a platform for Shavit’s fear of Palestinian return. “Do you personally have a right to 
return, a right to return to Talbieh in Jerusalem?” Shavit asks Said, and Said replies positively, 
emphasizing the right to return to the concrete home Shavit had described earlier in the piece. 
Shavit finds such an answer difficult to digest. He re-asks the question several times, at some 
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point realizing (though he still must ask): “So the demand to return is not abstract. It is not only 
a metaphor. Do you really mean it?7” Said insists that he does. Yet at the end of the interview, 
Shavit reframes this answer in a paragraph that merits quoting in length. This paragraph is 
brought only to the Hebrew-speaking reader, and was not translated in the English version of 
the article. It concludes the interview in Shavit’s voice rather than in Said’s—beyond the 
latter’s words, despite them, against them: 
What characterizes the New York scholar is a combination of several fascinating 
paradoxes: . . . On the one hand, Said is considered to be a resolute critic of 
imperialism, particularly British imperialism, but on the other he is . . . a typical 
and successful product of it: he was educated in the schools of the British Empire 
in Egypt, to which he was sent due to the capital his father made as a merchant 
under the patronage of the empire and thanks to his close ties with it. So perhaps 
the real personal drama of Said has to do with the fact that his real lost homeland 
was not Palestine. Said’s lost homeland is not geographical at all, but rather 
cultural. It was a Mediterranean bourgeois culture, Christian-Arab, open, 
pluralistic, that evolved in the eastern Mediterranean in the second half of the 
twentieth century. But this culture was dependent on the patronage of the large 
European powers, and when they retreated from the Middle East, it dissolved. Thus, 
the real disaster that defined the life of the individual person Edward Said was not 
the 1948 Nakba but the collapse of the class and culture to which he belonged. This 
collapse turned Said, his family members, and his fellow Christian-Arab 
bourgeoisie into placeless, stateless people, without any cultural home.8 
Not the Nakba but the collapse of empires; not an imperial domination but its very decline; 
very the loss not of place but of cultural affiliations; not land but culture; not concrete homes 
but metaphorical, abstract ones. Thus, Shavit (as the voice of Israelis) does not carry any 
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responsibility for this loss, which is an outcome of imperial realignments. But this paragraph 
is so foreign to the words preceding it that one must wonder how the two can inhabit the same 
article. Stoler reminds us that “people know and do not know, not sequentially but at the very 
same time.” This paragraph illustrates how “knowing is disabled, attention is redirected, things 
are renamed, and disregard is revived and sustained.”9 It is not that Shavit is blind; he goes to 
see Said’s house and describes it elaborately. It is not that he refuses to listen; he conducts a 
lengthy interview and brings Said’s words to print. But at the same time, he does something to 
these words; he “renames,” “disables,” and “disregards” them. 
By 2013, in his book My Promised Land: The Triumph and Tragedy of Israel, Shavit no longer 
“distorts” or “disables” words. He faces Israeli violence directly, as well as his role in it. The 
outcome of this recognition, however, is not rejection but an embrace of violence. Writing 
about the massacre that took place in 1948 in the then Palestinian city Lydda, he does not try 
to explain it away as an isolated incident or an accident. This was, he says with somewhat 
surprising honesty, “an inevitable phase of the Zionist revolution that laid the foundation for 
the Zionist state. Lydda was an integral part of our story.”10 When he looks at it candidly, 
Shavit confesses, “I see that the choice is stark: either reject Zionism because of Lydda, or 
accept Zionism with Lydda”11—crucially, not despite Lydda, but with Lydda. This is “a reality 
[he] cannot contain”: “I am not only sad, I am horrified,” he states. And yet only half a 
paragraph later, Shavit’s horror is replaced by acceptance. Those who committed the massacre, 
he declares, should not be condemned by Israelis with “bleeding hearts” who nevertheless 
“enjoy the fruits of [these commanders’] deeds.” “If need be,” he therefore concludes, “I’ll 
stand by the damned.” Shavit then, begins with marking his sadness and even horror, but these 
seem to be tokens which can very easily be dismissed. If we have thought that his heart bleeds, 
as he faced an uncontainable reality that made him “not only sad” but “horrified,” this is not 
the case. What could have been a mark of a conflicted self—a heart that is torn or injured till it 
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bleeds—is actually not his, and it those with the bleeding hearts who should be condemned, 
rather than the massacre. “Because I know that if it wasn’t for them, I would not have been 
born. They did the dirty, filthy work that enabled my people, myself, my daughter, and my son 
to live.”12 What seemed to be an existential crisis (sadness, horror, inability to contain one’s 
world) is instantly resolved. What is significant here is not merely the swift switch of positions, 
from sadness/horror to the very condemnation of those, but the explicit recognition that 
Shavit’s very identity and his ability to “enjoy the fruits” of prosperity is conditioned upon 
ethnic cleansing.  
*** 
My argument operates between these two points in time captured by Shavit’s 2003 interview 
and his 2013 book (points that are given here for the sake of simplification and should not be 
taken as precise historical coordinates). With Shavit, we can see a transformation from one way 
of relating to violence to another. The first manifests an ambivalent relation to violence, yet, 
as we saw, is not based on denial or willful blindness; the second resolves this ambivalence, 
yet does not celebrate violence. The next section points to three different ways of theorizing 
individuals’ and groups’ relations to their own violence. It passes through these possible 
relations (blindness, ambivalence, celebration). Of most interest to me is the idea, which 
captures something of the first moment of Shavit: whereas he is not “blind” to the violence of 
dispossession, Shavit of 2003 must create some separation between himself and this violence. 
This mechanism of separation or dissociation lies at the core of the model which will be at the 
focus of the next section’s analysis. While composed of many different, sometimes conflicting 
accounts of violence, this rests on a presupposition that selves cannot bear their own violence. 
But this is no longer the case by 2013, when Shavit acknowledges that his identity is dependent, 
if not merged with violence (recall: not despite Lydda but with it.) The subsequent section (#3) 
will propose a different way of thinking about the relation between selves and violence, which 
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may account better for the second moment above, and particularly to the ability to embrace 
violence as part of who one is. 
My purpose here is not to argue that one of these models is better able to explain violence than 
the others. At different moments, people tell their own stories differently and give a different 
account of themselves; within a single society, different subgroups exhibit political behavior 
that can best be explained by this or the other model, and so forth. Political structures, like 
psychological ones, are never fully coherent or stable. My purpose here is merely to add yet 
another approach that, I believe, is largely absent from current analyses and that, I contend, has 
a particular value for our current moment. 
 
2. “Compliance,” “Cruelty,” and “Dissociation”: Three Models for Violence 
The vast majority of the literature concerning how political communities see and understand 
their own mass can be divided, albeit schematically, into three main ways of conceptualizing 
violence. I label them as “compliance,” “cruelty,” and “dissociation.” As aforementioned, even 
though the three models are in tension with each other, most cases of violence can be 
understood by a combination of some of them. People can be cruel and lie to themselves—at 
different moments, in regard to different violences, or sometimes even in regard to one and the 
same occasion; we can be constituted by violence, yet still refuse to see it. In most societies, 
we can find all three of the above models: at times they function as competing narratives, 
sometimes dividing societies; at times one may gain more dominance; and at times one may be 
repressed or may (re)surface. 
The first model asks how people can live under atrocities-generating regimes: what enables 
people to accept, not object to, and even collaborate with state violence? The relevant literature 
is predominantly engaged with fascism and genocide (specifically, but not only, the holocaust) 
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and has provided different answers to this question: the power of authority,13 of ideology,14 of 
order itself,15 the bureaucratization of violence,16 or lack of an ability to think independently, 
particularly to think from the point of view of the other.17 What these explanations have in 
common, excluding the latter, is the idea that violence is located in some elsewhere. Violence 
is situated in something external (a leader, government, or social structure) and there is a 
psychological or sociological power that renders people collaborative, submissive, even 
cooperative. That is, people may respond to violence, accept it, even participate in it, but it is 
not part of who they are. If something is to be found in themselves instead of in these external 
sites where violence resides, it is a disposition to adhere to the violent powers (which may have 
to do with psycho-social factors, economic ones, etc.). It is precisely this externality that I want 
to question. 
Indeed, if we take the idea of democracy seriously, there is another question we need to pose, 
if not instead of, then alongside the above question: How can one play an active role in a violent 
political order?—not as subjected to the regime but as a subject in the second meaning of the 
term as well;18 as an “author,” as Hobbes would have it, of this violence? 
The second group consists of accounts that see violence as emerging from political sadism, 
cruelty, or institutional hatred,19 which are indeed integral to the political identity of those 
engaging in it. They show the different affectual dimensions implicated in practices that shape 
political cohorts (usually defined by race) through anchoring otherness in suffering. According 
to them, senses of belonging often emerge not merely through the exclusion of othered groups, 
but through further manifesting and experiencing otherness via a public spectacle of violence. 
Some of these theories discuss mental structures or personality attributes that allow people to 
take pleasure in others’ pain.20 Others focus on different ideological or institutional apparatuses 
that facilitate, sustain, justify, and encourage cruelty.21 Yet others point to political structures—
we can call them cruel—that shape people’s desires or ways of seeing not precisely as sadistic, 
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but as dismissive of violence. Specifically, these modes of organizing society place people in 
a different relation to the violence they inflict, allowing them to see it constantly, yet erasing 
the victims as suffering subjects. Here we find schemes of racism and dehumanization that 
render some lives less accounted for;22 pseudoscientific assumptions about the lack of pain 
among some people that erase the possibility of victimhood;23 or a framing of the other as a 
dangerous enemy whose killing is always justified. 
This model of cruelty, however, seems to be less suitable for the analysis of my case. Not 
merely because when I read Shavit, for example, I see an embrace of violence, yet no pleasure 
taken in the defeat of Palestinians (although this may be my own personal inability to see.) It 
is less adequate also because the “cruelty” model rests on an immediate relation to a suffering 
body, whereas the violence I am interested in theorizing here is often the violence of those who 
Robert Meister and later Bruce Robbins have termed “structural beneficiaries”: those who are 
not active perpetrators, but nonetheless obtain “material and social advantage” from various 
orders of violence;24 those who are situated on the oppressive side of these orders, whose well-
being (actual or perceived) is often dependent on the continuation of this oppression; those who 
should therefore be seen as exerting violence even if they do not actively engage in it.25 Here 
arrives the third model, the one I termed “dissociation,” which is probably the most common 
model used to explain imperial and colonial violence. 
This model can be found in a diverse and rich literature, including many liberal texts, but also 
significant segments of postcolonial literature, critical thought, and literature inspired by, or 
taking part in, projects of truth and reconciliation. In my own geopolitical context, it can be 
found in most of the relevant literature on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. These bodies of 
thought can by no means be reduced to a single account. Yet, within this richness, one principle 
seems to be shared: if violence is to endure (at least in democratic societies), a gap, if not a rift, 
must be introduced between the self and the violent actions of herself or her group. 
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Using Stanley Cohen’s very wide mapping,26 alongside the work of many others who have 
engaged in such research, we can outline the various modes of such dissociation. They are not 
always as neatly separable as in the list below. For the sake of illustration, they will be 
accompanied by concrete examples from Israel/Palestine. 
• A complete rejection of the facts. E.g., “there were no Palestinian villages in this place”; 
or: “the Palestinians who were here left because their leaders persuaded them to do so in 
order to aid the war effort.” And we already see from these two formulations that both 
“rejection” and “facts” come in different types and gradients. Salman Abu Sitta speaks in 
this context of a “collective amnesia,” which further complicates the relation between the 
known and the unknown, since what is forgotten was known.27 In another settler-colonial 
context, Janet McIntosh refers to “structural oblivion” to show that the work that forgetting 
requires is often done at levels beyond the individual and can therefore not be seen, at least 
not often, as deliberate.28 
• A reorganization of the facts within a framework that alters their signification. For instance: 
reframing violence as self-protection and aggression as victimhood. E.g. “the Palestinians 
who indeed were here, and whom we indeed expelled or killed, were about to exterminate 
us; we had no choice”. Or, alternatively: altering signification by using language that 
diminishes the violent act, such as the prevalent formulation in the passive: “these 
Palestinians have found their death”29. We can tie these to Charles Mills’s notion of 
“epistemological ignorance”:30 an expression pointing to the fact that sometimes, people 
are unable to understand or interpret (even if able to see) injustices. 
• Psychological, sociopolitical, or structural mechanisms allowing a continuous sidelining of 
the truth; not a denial as such, but a marginalization of the facts to the periphery of knowing, 
of seeing, of the political matter, so that life can continue uninterrupted, despite what is 
known. A good example is Stoler’s notion of colonial aphasia: a mode of simultaneously 
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denying and seeing, even being obsessed with, the colonial past.31 Lisa Lowe termed this 
duality “the economy of affirmation and forgetting.”32 This is often done alongside various 
methods of organizing entire political spaces of visibility in ways that render some truths 
more difficult to discover. The foresting of destroyed Palestinian villages after 1948, or an 
elevated road system in the West Bank that renders existing Palestinian villages less visible 
can serve as examples.33 
• Psychological, sociopolitical, and structural mechanisms of deferral, disavowal, deflection, 
and repression that secure the self from the potentially shattering implications of that which 
is known. We are quite familiar with such mechanisms on the psychological level (e.g., in 
dealing with childhood trauma); on the political level, we can think with Jeanne Morefield’s 
concept of deflection: turning the gaze away from violent actions to a liberal identity that 
is presumably always already there, regardless of these actions. The alleged stability of 
identity means that the violent actions cannot contaminate it. Accordingly, by pointing to 
the liberal identity of the empire, its imperial (illiberal) doings can simultaneously be 
acknowledged and their meanings and implications for one’s identity denied.34 Ariella 
Azoulay and Adi Ophir point to a different mechanism operating along the same principles: 
they show how expressing shock and outrage at violent acts that are allegedly “excessive” 
allows Israelis to reaffirm their own morality, as well as the morality of occupation.35 
• Finally, ideological apparatuses that allow violence to be reframed as nonviolence. Such 
mechanisms range from schemes like “progress” or “the “white-man’s burden” as a mode 
of framing imperial domination, to notions such as “bringing democracy to the world” as a 
scheme justifying warfare, or the Israeli version of “enlightened occupation.” All these 
allow for framing violence as something that is actually beneficial to its victims, and 
therefore not in conflict with the liberal-democratic identity of the 
perpetrators/beneficiaries. 
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This rough map, which can surely be unpacked more slowly, ties together very different 
accounts that nevertheless share three connected assumptions: first, that in order to realize the 
formation and sustainment of political identities within ethical schemes, the violence of 
imperial and colonial endeavors (or other forms of institutionalized mass violence) must be 
dissociated from the large political communities—or political imaginations—involved in them. 
This, in turn, rests on a second presupposition—seldom made explicitly but seeming to be a 
logical necessity—that there is some tension, if not a contradiction, between violence and the 
self. Without this presupposition, there would be no need to assume this vast apparatus of 
dissociation. Thus, even though many of the abovementioned authors do see violence as 
constitutive of identities, they nevertheless see these identities as having to constantly negotiate 
with this violence. To take one example: even though Morefield’s argument concerning the 
politics of deferral refutes the idea that the violence of Anglo-American imperialism does not 
represent “who we are,” it nevertheless sees the sustainability of imperial violence as a function 
of the ability to constantly disconnect this violence from the “we” engaging in it: imperial 
violence is narrated and recognized by Anglo-American liberals, she argues, via “prolonged 
and creative forms of deflection that constantly ask the reader to avert her eyes, away from 
colonial violence and economic exploitation, and back towards the liberal nature of the imperial 
society.”36 My point is that the complex apparatus that Morefield identifies is necessary only 
when, and as long as, the identity of the “we” is perceived as being, or indeed is, in 
contradiction to imperial violence. I do not argue that this apparatus is not in operation; merely 
that in some cases, it is insufficient to account for the relations of some liberals to their 
violence—violence that they see as part of who they indeed are. Think of Shavit’s words about 
Lydda in the previous section. On the one hand, we can find in them components from the 
above list such as pointing to a lack of choice as part of a struggle for survival. And yet, unlike 
the typical dissociation strategy this does not become a discourse of reversed victimhood. 
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Lydda is depicted explicitly in terms of a massacre. Moreover, unlike the strategy of pointing 
to one’s own shock and outrage facing “excessive” violence as a way of reaffirming both one’s 
morality and normalized violence, Shavit points to the “excessive” violence itself as part of the 
story of the self. In other words, in the above examples (see particularly the 4th bullet), we find 
a mode of identifying isolated cases of violence as (i) excessive and thus exceptional, and (ii) 
in need to be fixed or prevented. This allows a sense of self righteousness, because the self is 
(i) horrified and (ii) condemns violence and desires fixing/prevention, thereby performs one’s 
dissociation from these acts. However Shavit, even if horrified, does not seek to fix, condemn, 
or isolate the massacre. It is the very massacre, he claims, that is part of who he is.     
The third shared assumption of the above theories is that therefore, in order to resist these 
endeavors, a certain politics of exposure, memory, or recognition is called for, which makes 
violence more visible. Such visibility would presumably undo the possibility of the gap 
between the individual/group and their violence, and thus undo the possibility of sustaining 
violence. If the denial of violence, as any form of denial, is done to protect the self from the 
implications of that which can threaten identity, and if, at the same time and for the same 
reason, denial is also what allows atrocities to go on, then the role of critique according to this 
model is to remove envelopes of justification. The truth, as it were, must be confronted, in a 
process that—much like psychoanalysis—is simultaneously traumatic and cathartic. This is not 
always (not often) a naïve endeavor, and most of the accounts above are critical and astute in 
their perception of the political reality. My goal here is by no means to refute or ridicule them. 
My point is that I identify in them a glimmer of hope—a hope I share myself—that such an act 
of dismantling the mechanisms of dissociation would contribute to undermining the façade of 
liberal identity, force it to confront its reality, and thereby push for political change. These 
assumptions, however, fail to acknowledge that violence is not always in conflict with the self 
or the community, but something whose very loss may threaten the self. 
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The next section seeks to propose, still initially, a way of thinking about political violence that 
is integral to identity in recognized ways (a way, if you will, to theorize the second moment of 
Shavit above). The subsequent section (4) will return to the case of Israel/Palestine to draw 
initial conclusions regarding the role of a critique of violence.  
 
3. “Desire”: A proposition 
The fourth model I seek to outline below for mass/state/institutionalized violence joins the 
three above models. It follows the framework of subject formation in order to argue that 
subjects in positions of privilege are likely to be attached to the conditions allowing these 
privileges to endure, even when these generate, sustain, or are themselves a form of violence 
(property in capitalism or home/land in settler colonialism are just two of the more obvious 
examples). Moreover, these attachments do not—or not always—become possible despite this 
violence, or because people are able to ignore it, but sometimes are mediated by violence itself. 
To demarcate this model, I begin with the context of sexual desire. With important inversions 
and reservations, this desire captures something of the model I want to propose. Let us begin, 
then, on an individual level, and moreover, from the injured subject who is often theorized 
using this model, and then move on to the theorization of the injurious subject, and finally to 
large-scale injurious groups. 
By way of illustration, consider this conversation, from the story “Strangers in the Home” by 
Ronit Matalon. Guiding her friend, who is about to have sex for the first time, this teenager’s 
voice encapsulates the intimacies of violence I want to highlight here: 
Look, you are getting undressed, right? Lying in bed—you next to the wall and he 
next to you. You take off your jewelry, your hairpins, everything, everything, and 
put it all in a small pile on the bedside dresser. Then you stand in front of him. You 
Accepted version; do not cite or circulate. Final and edited version is available through Political Theory Journal: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591719861714 
 15 
do nothing . . . Just don’t be alarmed if you start shaking. You always shake at first, 
in an effort to tear away the voice, the memory of the freezing touch; from the fact 
that when he imprints his marks on your neck, it is not you his touch addresses; 
from this thought that you cannot control—a thought preparing you to be a woman 
. . . Then he gets on top of you . . . You need to open your legs, but be careful, not 
too much, you’ll see . . . if you open them too much . . .  it hurts. . . . But it’s a good 
pain, you will want it a little bit, this is how you feel the time passing . . . If you 
bleed just ask for a towel and all that.37 
The blood that needs to be cleaned; the body trembling from a touch, or just the thought of a 
touch that seems to hurt more than it causes pleasure (a freezing touch that might bring to mind 
an act of strangling as it leaves its imprint on the neck); the act of tearing—tearing the self from 
herself, but also being torn by another; all these are part of the injury—the pain—that is 
identified in this paragraph as sex, as the meaning of “be[ing] a woman.” It is part of what one 
learns to want and is inseparable from what will become her desire. This is not to say that any 
sex is always injurious, and it is certainly not to argue that any sex is a form of rape (in fact, it 
is precisely the injury that cannot be identified with acts of raping, or sadistic desires, that is of 
interest to me here). It is to rehearse, albeit briefly and anecdotally, what several feminist 
schools have shown at least since the early 1960s if not before, even if in radically different 
ways: that the most intimate relations can be violent or that violence can be intimate; that its 
presence is not a destruction of the familiar fabric of life, but part of it.38 
Significant to my own argument is that there is not an “I” beyond this structure of desire who 
is being “misled” to want what harms her. The “I” emerges through this desire and cannot be 
freed by the power of truth about oppression (which is not to say that oppression must be 
accepted or that a struggle against it is impossible). To jump ahead, this point will be important 
for the question concerning the role of critique of violence that I pose in what follows: If these 
Accepted version; do not cite or circulate. Final and edited version is available through Political Theory Journal: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591719861714 
 16 
relations to injury (and through it to violence) are constitutive of the self, then a critique 
rendering violence more visible would not have the same liberating power often ascribed to it. 
Much like the injury that cannot be disentangled from the “I,” so will be the violence in contexts 
of social identities based on domination (patriarchy, white supremacy, settler colonialism). 
What has to be contended with, then, are not questions of exposure or knowledge, but of the 
very conditions that render violence constitutive. 
Judith Butler has probably phrased this understanding most eloquently: 
 Called by an injurious name, I come into social being . . . I am led to embrace the 
terms that injure me because they constitute me socially. If we then understand 
certain kinds of interpellations to confer identity, those injurious interpellations will 
constitute identity through injury.39 
For Butler, this claim has both an ontological dimension and a sociohistorical one. 
Ontologically, it is a function of the fact that as corporeal creatures, we are vulnerable,40 and 
of the fact that from birth, bodies are both dependent on others if they are to survive and are 
shaped by social norms (even if never deterministically or fully so). But this is, as Butler puts 
it, a “social ontology.”41 First, it is social because this vulnerability is precisely a function of 
our social interdependence and interconnectivity. It is because of our deep sociality that we 
cannot form significant ties to others and to the world without being undone, Butler teaches us, 
and this undoing is both a form of injury and what makes us so vulnerable to being injured by 
the other’s doings (betraying us, leaving us, leaving the world, but also sometimes merely a 
look, a touch, or the lack thereof). Second, it is “social,” or rather “political,” because it is a 
function of the particular social webs, kinship formations, works of power, forms of rule, and 
social hierarchies within a given society.42 My case of analysis, however, will be different, 
since it is situated from the outset within a particular political constellation and is about political 
positionality rather than ontological conditions of subjectivity as such. Butler herself insists on 
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this distinction when she states, together with Athena Athanasiou, that it is crucial to 
distinguish between the conditions of subject formation in and through injury, and the injury 
that is the outcome of particular political constellations or actions. The former are “at the 
fundamental level of subjection,” while the latter are the object of resistance and 
transformation.43 What is nonetheless important for me in this ontology of openness, is one 
insight that will be relevant also to the political analysis: An affective attachment opens us to 
injury in ways that sometimes make it impossible to dissociate injury from attachment.  
Lauren Berlant situates this structure of attachment at the core of capitalist society. Berlant 
shows that the need to protect the “I” makes us hold on to objects of attachment—or perhaps 
better: to the very permanency of an object, or to the idea of permanency itself—even when 
these inflict injuries of various kinds: “The subjects who have x in their lives might not well 
endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-
being, because whatever the content of the attachment, the continuity of the form of it provides 
something of the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living on and to 
look forward to being in the world.”44 Thus, we hold on to objects, even when these are 
“problematic objects,” and even when they generate “compromised conditions of 
possibility,”45 as part of an almost tragic effort to stabilize identity—the meaning of who we 
are. 
In both Butler’s and Berlant’s accounts, violence emerges not as something that threatens 
identities, but as what sustains them; in both, violence therefore also becomes an object of 
desire, or is at least woven into a desire for other objects; in both, this nexus wherein violence 
and desire coproduce each other is a function of the particular social conditions that constitute 
identity (images of the good life in Berlant, heteronormative forms of socialization in Butler). 
These last three points will be central to the analysis of violent identities that I propose here, 
with one significant difference. In the above accounts, injury and identity are most often 
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considered from the perspective of those injured—by others, by structures, by a particular 
construction of identity. In my analysis, however, the optics will be reversed to think of those 
who generate injury.46  
What I propose is a structural reversal that is for now a hypothesis: If subjects emerge via the 
social conditions in which they are born and that continue to form them as they continue living, 
and if, as Butler and Berlant argue, we come to desire these conditions even when they are 
injurious, then we should at least entertain the possibility that sociopolitical conditions that are 
founded on ongoing violence—such as settlement or colonization—are likely to give rise to a 
particular mode of attachment to one’s own violence. 
The desire for violence I seek to pinpoint is a function of the particular structure of the settler 
state in which one’s very presence, one’s very political identity, is a form of taking the place 
of someone else; a form of dispossession, removal, domination, ethnic cleansing. There is not 
an “I,” in the case of the settler, without dispossession, if not elimination, of natives, and so the 
effort to stabilize identity, to hold on to the “continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means 
to keep on living and to look forward to being in the world” (to return to Berlant) is inextricable 
from this violence. The desire here would not be for violence or suffering itself (as in the case 
of the cruelty model, for example in public lynching), but rather for territory. And yet this 
attachment to territory is intimately linked to forms of violence that render it one of the 
conditions of living. Again, recall Shavit’s recognition that “the dirty, filthy work that [was 
done] enabled my people, myself, my daughter, and my son to live”. 
A fuller analysis of such desires will have to move between understanding individual settlers 
and their modes of attachment on the one hand, and on the other, settler communities, in which 
such “structures of feelings” become more explicitly political. It will also have to move 
between an analysis of different and shifting political arrangement and what we may call the 
“ontology of settler colonialism” or what Wolfe would call its structure.  What is important to 
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bear in mind is that all these strata are sociohistorical and can vary widely in its implications: 
even if we think structurally, on the logic of elimination, on the very presence of the settler as 
a violent one (this would be the “ontological” dimension), this violence can take many forms, 
ranging from active genocide to legal discrimination and to genuine efforts of sharing the land. 
All this is to say, again, that the structural claim does not preclude political work. 
 
4. Violence and Visibility  
         
Figures 1-2 katzrin (left), and the Hermon River, at the edge of the Golan Height. Photographs by 
Oded Balilty. 
 
Let us return to the Israeli context. In different ways, the accounts under the rubric of 
“dissociation” in section 2 called, as I proposed, for a politics of visibility: for exposing 
violence in order to break the hold of power. And yet the Israeli visual field is inlaid with 
remnants of past violence that, being part of the daily view, is simultaneously denied and 
asserted. Israeli tanks or old military airplanes can be found in parks or playgrounds, and ruins 
of Palestinian homes often “decorate” serene scenery for hikes or family picnics (see images 
1–2). The violence that these remnants constantly bring to the surface, but with this constant 
reminder also make banal—the Palestinian Nakba and the wars that followed—has become an 
essential part of the personal history of many who grew up in this place. “When one travels in 
Israel,” Noga Kadman writes, “it is almost impossible to avoid seeing piles of stones, ruins, 
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collapsing walls and structures overgrown with uncultivated almond and fig trees, rolling 
terraces crumbling with disuse, and long hedges of prickly cactuses.”47 These landscapes are 
woven into the memories of family hikes, afterschool activities, or simply being at home. I 
recall trips with my father along an abandoned railway to the ruins of Na’ane, which was close 
to the kibbutz where he was born and where my grandparents still lived. I recall going bathing 
on hot summer days in a pool that was built by the Syrian army for its officers. We knew it was 
called “the officer’s pool,” we always passed through the traces of war on our way to it, and 
yet this was “our” pool, a site of beauty amidst fig trees, whose freezing water became our 
challenge—who would be brave enough to jump? My childhood memories, my home, cannot 
be detached from the violence of 1948 and 1967.48 The point, then, is not that we could not see 
the remnants of violence, but that we saw them all the time and almost everywhere. 
Nevertheless, as I showed above, so much of the critique of Israeli violence focuses on tropes 
of “erasure,” “denial,” or “blindness.” Perhaps this is because it is easier to explain one’s ability 
to destroy in light of one’s blindness to destruction and its effects. Without the paradigm of 
blindness or dissociation, an affirmative relation to destruction must be contended with. It is 
this affirmative relation that I seek to explain. 
My argument in regard to this visual saturation of traces of violence is similar to, yet crucially 
different from, Gil Hochberg’s claim concerning the (necessary) failure to erase the violence 
of the past: “these repeated attempts to erase, resignify, and evacuate the historical meaning of 
the Palestinian ruins . . . nevertheless fail (they are bound to fail) to successfully repress the 
haunting impact that these ruins continue to have over Israelis and Israeli culture,” Hochberg 
claims. For her, this impossibility to erase and deny is what animates resistance and what 
disrupts Zionist narratives, yet Hochberg’s words also open the possibility of making an 
altogether different argument: Since, as she says, the “visible invisibility” of such traces is “a 
central feature in Israeli cultural and political imagination,”49 one cannot simply talk here about 
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an interruption of identity; one must seriously consider the possibility that Israeli identity 
cannot be separated from these landscapes of violence. 
When one longs for and belongs to this landscape, one does not take pleasure in the direct pain 
inflicted on others (the cruelty model), yet this pain cannot be fully separated from the spaces 
of belonging that construct the sense of self (political, communal, individual). The “I” who 
finds a home in these spaces, in those traces, and who is thus also defined by them, is 
conditioned (also) by the violence they mark, remind her of, and carry with them from the past, 
even if this violence is mediated by time and by other people. Put differently, the Israeli Jew is 
a product of the history of destruction that has led to the construction of the Israeli state and 
has been accompanying it ever since. Or more generally: within the structure of settlement, the 
conditions of possibility of the “I”—her place, her community, her home—are injurious ones—
and thus the Butlerian scheme should be reversed: the “I,” to paraphrase the quote from the 
previous section, comes to embrace the terms through which she injures others because they 
constitute her socially. This injury can be intentional or not, direct or structural. It can be 
celebrated by the injuring person, ignored by them, or even hurt their sense of self, but it is 
nonetheless part of who they are. 
It is true that one could refer to these traces of violence as already naturalized, decontextualized, 
and drained of their political meaning; or one could talk about a visual saturation that itself 
leads to normalization and with it to forms of not seeing (a claim with which we are familiar 
from critical discussions concerning humanitarian work). But it seems to me that  there is 
something too easy about explaining the Israeli gaze, the attachment to these sites of ruin, via 
ideological mechanisms that explain violence away (from denial and blindness, to 
naturalization or resignification, or to the claim that most has been erased). The explanation so 
many scholars use and that I used to employ myself, namely that we could not see or that we 
were not seeing things for what they were, seems insufficient to me, not utterly wrong, but 
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conveniently partial. The aim of this brief intervention is to propose an alternative, or better: a 
supplementary way of thinking about one’s relations to the disaster they produce. It is also to 
ask what the implications on the possibility of critique would be given those relations.  
If violence conditions one’s very being—her political identity, language, cultural references, 
material support—then the power of critique is limited, at best, in its ability to push for political 
change. Moreover, rendering violence visible (as a form of critique) can rather lead to the 
unapologetic acceptance of this violence. I believe this is what we see today in Israel, and many 
other places, particularly the United States. During the 2012 Nakba memorial ceremony at Tel 
Aviv University, activists of the then new right-wing organization Im Tirtzu (in Hebrew, “if 
you will it,” after the famous words of Herzl) surrounded the demonstrators and, mimicking a 
famous Israeli song, chanted: “we brought Nakba upon you,” ironically paraphrasing the 
original words: “we brought peace upon you” (hevenu shalom alechem). Rather than attacking 
the demonstrators by denying that the Nakba ever took place (the common attitude at the time), 
the right-wing activists celebrated the fact that it did, and perhaps also called for a new one. By 
2014, the right-wing party The Jewish Home (Haba’it Haiehudi) launched a campaign under 
the title “no longer apologizing” (mafsikim lehitnatzel.)50F50 This was four months after Israel had 
killed more than 2,200 Palestinians 51F51 as part of what was described by many as a severe 
violation of human rights. Although not directly so, given the predominant public debate at the 
time, one could not but wonder whether The Jewish Home’s campaign was a call to stop 
apologizing for what Israel had just done in Gaza. The campaign, which called on people to 
stop apologizing for “loving Israel”—a love that explicitly included its occupied parts—was 
accompanied by a concrete program to annex vast parts of the West Bank (all C territories), 
thereby making the state of apartheid explicit.52F52 By the 2019 election campaign, the political 
center also adopted this unapologetic approach and the campaign for the new “Blue and White” 
party took pride that his leader, Benny Gantz, “brought Gaza back to the stone age” and killed 
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1364 “terrorists” during the 2014 military campaign.  This unapologetic approach is obviously 
not simply the outcome of a left-critique that sought to render the violence of the regime more 
visible. Yet such a critique plays into, if not works in tandem with, a re-affirmation of violence. 
In asking people to confront who they “really are” it pushes to an affirmation of such identity, 
even if this identity is dependent on apartheid or occupation. To target this violence, then, it is 
not sufficient to expose it. 
The structure I sought to identify at the foundation of political belonging thus undergoes slow 
but also rapid changes. The structural and the historical stories must accordingly be unfolded 
in their distinctness but also in their interdependence—a work of weaving them apart and then 
back together again, that is still to be done.  
 
Conclusion and beyond  
By pointing to a violence that cannot be separated from identity, this paper sought to offer a 
model for understanding the ways by which mass/state/institutionalized violence is made 
acceptable. This model joins the three primary models existing in the literature. Unlike the 
model of compliance, it sees political violence as rooted in people themselves; unlike the model 
based on dissociation, it accounts for violence that cannot be explained by modes of invisibility 
or denial (it refuses the claim that people do not see or do not know, or that they distort and 
reframe their knowledge so its meaning or political implication dwindles); and unlike the model 
of cruelty, it does not see this violence as an outcome of cruelty or maliciousness, thereby 
perhaps keeping open the possibility of a shared political future. 
In proposing that we think of this violence, this identity, via the feminist/queer model of desire, 
I do not claim, for example, that we should compare settlers to men in a heteronormative 
society, or settlement to rape.53 I do not seek to propose here a complete analogy but rather a 
model, which, like any model, offers a schematic, initial guideline and is limited in its 
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applicability to changing test cases. A brief review of some proposed paths for decolonization 
can begin to show what it would mean to think of critique from this perspective. 
In different ways, Lorenzo Veracini, Mahmood Mamdani, and Raef Zreik proposed that with 
a radical change in the structure of the settler state, the categories settler/native can be 
dissolved; not in ways that turn the settler into a native (the title of Zreik and Mamdani’s 
dialogue-of-sorts might insinuates this), but in ways that make this distinction less meaningful, 
at least in its political bearings.54 Decolonization is thus the process through which the settler 
ceases to be a settler, since the structure of the state itself changes.55 This provides an 
institutional/structural path for decolonization without violence, that as such seems quite 
tempting. But if the “I” of the settler, her very being, is shaped by, and immersed in this 
structure, as I argued, then this change must go deeper than a change in legal categories and 
access to rights, as Zreik claims when he promotes the idea of equal juridical citizenship, or 
deeper even than equal access to material resources, as a more Marxist account would insist. 
To “kill the settler in the man,” as Veracini puts it56 is to kill so much of the man himself that 
the distinction becomes questionable. This is not just because it is analytically messy, but also 
because politically, I cannot imagine it taking place: it is to demand that he will give up his 
property (or at least some of it), his language, his cultural references, but also, if I am correct, 
that he change his “structures of feeling,” modes of desire and attachments—to places, to 
people. I do not say that these are not just demands; but these changes are not easily 
manufactured. 
Although undoubtedly necessary, institutional change consisting of democratizing the settler 
state is not sufficient, because it leaves intact the deep structures of racialized hierarchies, 
violent desires, and attachments to dispossession. These are not psychological structures, but 
sociopolitical ones, since they have to do with our modes of living together. An analogy to 
Marx’s critique of Bauer’s critique of religion may clarify this point. As Marx argued in the 
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Jewish Question, liberation that occurs on the ideological, institutional level of the state leaves 
unregulated, even protected an entire domain of human existence that is still governed by 
oppression. But whereas a Marxist solution involving the redistribution of material resources 
is necessary, it, too, leaves intact a domain of human existence where oppression can reside: 
structures of feelings, sentiments and attachments. Thus (still following Marx), if Bauer 
proposes to free humankind from religion by privatizing it, and if Marx’s response to this 
proposition points to America as a secular state where religion still thrives,57 (that is, a proof 
that freedom at the institutional level is insufficient, if not destructive), my response to Zreik 
or Veracini is to point to America as a democratized settler state, where racism and white 
supremacy still thrive. Further, it is to argue, together with Marx, that material reality changes 
consciousness; but beyond him, to suggest that when we think of material reality, we must 
think beyond domains of economy and take into account affectual politics (after all, if we think 
with Butler, affect is material.) 
I am not sure how one dismantle structures of desire. I have seen people changing their mode 
of attachment to territories, landscapes and others, especially through political activism, but 
not in ways that can become the foundation for a policy proposition. In this sense, my 
intervention is limited to marking the domain about which we should ask some of our 
questions, rather than providing answers, but I hope that in so doing, it can open a different set 
of conversations.    
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